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SPEECH ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES:
ANYTHING BUT SAFE
AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
ACCEPTANCE LETTER

Amanda Richey

“Sticks and stones may break my bones but words can
never hurt me.” The sentiment behind the popular nursery
rhyme animates debates over “safe spaces” and “trigger
warnings” in higher education, as rivals disagree over the extent
to which students should feel protected in their diversity of
identities and experiences. Opponents view these speech
policies as opportunities for individuals to “retreat from ideas
and perspectives at odds with their own,” and as fundamentally
counterproductive to informed debate.1
These arguments become more interesting when analyzed in media markets. Complex issues of academic freedom,
student speech, and respect of difference are condensed and
often expurgated through pundit quips about “politically correct
(PC) culture.” Until recently, the body of work concerning this
cultural moment was largely confined to academic circles; after
all campus speech obviously concerns campuses. Inside Higher
Ed and The Chronicle of Higher Education mention the term
“safe space” in featured articles from the mid 2000s forward
and the 1990s forward, respectively.2 These narrow debates
1

Ellison, 2016, lines 14 - 15
https://www.insidehighered.com/search/site/%22safe%20spaces%22
?page=9
and
http://www.chronicle.com/search?q=safe+space&published_date=3_o
r_more_years (accessed December 3, 2016).
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gained public traction in November 2015 when volatile race
relations at the University of Missouri, stemming from Black
Lives Matter advocacy, created scenes for mass media circulation (including Melissa Click’s muscular “enforcement” of free
speech spaces even against student media coverage).3 Later that
year, worries about cultural appropriation and free expression
in Halloween costumes at Yale only compounded the concern
that universities had become unhinged in their handling of
student speech.4 These examples provided conservative pundits
fodder for news stories that “liberal indoctrination” had
convinced most faculty and students that their identity performances were more important than rigorous or thoughtful
debate. “The Coddling of the American Mind,” published in
The Atlantic in the fall of 2015, helped frame public concern in
one cohesive narrative: college students are hiding from or even
actively opposing ideas that make them uncomfortable. This
narrative, in addition to contemporary news stories, entered a
polarized media landscape demarcated by partisan alliances.
A seemingly innocuous acceptance letter, directed to
students in the Class of 2020 from the University of Chicago’s
Dean of Students in The College, also entered this media
environment. The letter gained prominent coverage in mainstream American media in August of 2016 for its firm condemnation of “intellectual safe spaces” and “trigger warnings.” The
acceptance letter reinvigorated discussion about safe spaces,
both within academic circles and within a broader public. While
the letter could simply be read as a formal introduction to
campus speech norms, or a marketing stunt to spread the
University of Chicago’s name, it also represents a renewed lay

3

Conor Friedersdorf, "Campus Activists Weaponize 'Safe Space,'"
The Atlantic, November 10 2015.
4

Anemona Hartocollis, "Yale Lecturer Resigns After Email on
Halloween Costumes," The New York Times, 7 December 2015.
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interest in free speech regulation and identity on American
college campuses.
This essay will analyze the University of Chicago acceptance letter as the latest text to enter a body of work in the
American public addressing campus speech and speech
protection. After an overview of the cultural history of American campus speech concerns, the rhetorical situation will be
described to better illuminate the Dean’s possible intentions
under the specific conditions. Next, the essay moves to an
analysis of the dominant ideographs and structural elements
within the University of Chicago text, followed by a comparison with other college acceptance letters. Finally, the essay will
outline the initial response to the University of Chicago letter
and indicate the potential significance of the text to the contemporary cultural moment.
From Movements to Codes to “Coddling:”
The Cultural Context
The text’s condemnation of trigger warnings and intellectual safe spaces emerged from a recurring cultural fascination with the regulation of American campus speech that goes
back 50 years. The 1960s are renowned for student activism —
from the civil rights movement to the anti-war movement.
However, one movement in the fall of 1964 specifically
addressed students’ rights to free speech, and “was the first
major campus rebellion” of the decade, according to one
scholar.5 The Free Speech Movement at the University of
California, Berkeley united thousands of students, and eventually gained extensive faculty support, against the university’s
president and deans for restricting political advocacy on
campus. After three months of sit-ins and rallies, faculty in the
5

Robby Cohen, "Berkeley Free Speech Movement: Paving the Way
for Campus Activism." OAH Magazine of History 1, no. 1 (April 1,
1985):16.
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Academic Senate voted to vindicate student leaders facing
administrative backlash and endorsed the movement’s underlying principle that the “‘content of speech or advocacy should
not be restricted by the university.’”
In the 1980s and 1990s, national coverage of campus
speech shifted to the defense of college’s brand reputation, as
public funding decreased and pressure to compete nationally
increased. Racist incidents gained broad exposure, with the help
of recently created 24-hour cable news channels. In response,
campuses created policy punishing intentionally derogatory
language in “hate speech codes.” The necessity of hate speech
codes, beyond normal student conduct procedures, worried
students and faculty,6 and lawyers questioned the constitutionality of these policies.7 According to Gould, by the mid- to late1990s hate speech policies had “actually increased in number
following a series of court decisions that ostensibly found many
to be unconstitutional.”8 The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) published a statement cautioning
against the use of campus speech codes in the July 1992 issue
of Academe, the association’s peer reviewed journal. The
statement warned against speech codes and the slippery slope
they might create “to differentiate between high-value and lowvalue speech, or to choose which groups are to be protected by
curbing the speech of others.”9 Further, the statement reaffirmed the importance of freedom of expression and, at the very
least, toleration of ideas that members of academic communi6

Charles R. Lawrence, "If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus." Duke Law Journal, no. 3 (1990): 434.
7
Jon B. Gould, "The Precedent That Wasn't: College Hate Speech
Codes and the Two Faces of Legal Compliance." Law & amp Society
Review 35, no. 2 (2001): 345.
8
Ibid.
9
American Association of University Professors. "On Freedom of
Expression and Campus Speech Codes." Academe 78, no. 4 (July/August 1992): 30-31.
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ties may hate. “Free speech is not simply an aspect of the
educational enterprise to be weighed against other desirable
ends. It is the very precondition of the academic enterprise
itself.”10
The current rendition of American campus speech concerns is one marked by what critics call a “hypersensitivity”
among college students and the “return of political correctness”
policing speech.11 According to Lukianoff and Haidt in “The
Coddling of the American Mind”:
A movement is arising, undirected and driven largely
by students, to scrub campuses clean of words, ideas,
and subjects that might cause discomfort or give offense…This new climate is slowly being institutionalized, and is affecting what can be said in the classroom, even as a basis for discussion.12
Lukianoff and Haidt backed this claim with evidence of
already widely circulated contemporary race and diversity
scandals and student demands for safe spaces in these heated
exchanges. This narrative took for granted the significant social
frictions created by Black Lives Matter protests against police
brutality and mass incarceration, the worry about Hispanic
immigration, and the fear of Islamic extremism. Still, significant buzzwords of “safe space” and “trigger warning” propelled
fear that anybody might declare their narrow viewpoint as
“safe” and themselves “triggered” by any viewpoints in tension
with their own, and media coverage could easily find significant and worrisome examples of both.
10

Ibid., 31.
Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, "The Coddling of the American Mind.," The Atlantic, September 2015. Peter Beinart, "Political
Correctness Is Back," The Atlantic, October 2014.
12
Lukianoff and Haidt, "The Coddling of the American Mind.”
11
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Both terms originated before the current culture solidified their usage to refer almost exclusively to speech. According to Catherine Fox, safe spaces first appeared on college
campuses in the early 1990s as physical places for LGBTQ+
students to be welcomed.13 The Gay, Lesbian, and Straight
Education Network (GLSEN) spearheaded this effort through
its safe space training kit and ally network programs, which the
group still continues today. The term “trigger warning” has a
more ambiguous origin, though it appears to have first emerged
as a concept relating to treatment for PTSD. The term later
gained prevalence in self-help and feminist forums on the
Internet, “where they allowed readers who had suffered from
traumatic events like sexual assault to avoid graphic content
that might trigger flashbacks or panic attacks.”14 The social
significance of both terms had, however, shifted from their
original meanings when Lukianoff and Haidt documented cases
of students exempting themselves from texts, videos, or
experiences they found offensive or even just causing strong
emotional responses in classroom settings.15 Exact definitions
of both terms remain obscure despite their widespread usage in
contemporary culture. The generally polarized understanding of
these terms, and their perceived dangers or necessities as
policies, is possible because the terms are poorly defined
among American news-consuming publics.
Corporatization of education has also led to a shift in
focus, onto students’ emotional well-being and built environments that are “conducive” to learning, whatever that means. At
the same time, social demands make the expected outcomes of
collegiate experience more severe and anxiety producing. In
2015 the number one mental health diagnosis among American
13

Catherine Fox, "From Transaction to Transformation:
(En)Countering White Heteronormativity in "Safe Spaces" College
English 69, no. 5 (May 2007): 498.
14
Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015.
15
Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015.
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college students officially changed from depression to anxiety.16 According to The Wall Street Journal, in 2016 “nationwide, 17 percent of college students were diagnosed with or
treated for anxiety problems during the past year, and 13.9
percent were diagnosed with or treated for depression, according to a spring 2016 survey of 95,761 students by the American
College Health Association.”17 The percentage of college
students with anxiety rose over five percent since 2011.18 The
conversations surrounding speech on campuses inevitably are
attuned to students’ mental health, though institutions disagree
on what policies best support their students, and by extension
their public images.
Recent policy changes also accompany the current preoccupation with speech in American higher education, reflecting the corporatization and anxiety. The federal Departments of
Justice and Education edited language in a statute defining
sexual harassment to broaden the punishable offense from
speech that is “objectively offensive” to speech that is “unwelcome” in 2013.19 According to Lukianoff and Haidt, this
legislative shift in sexual harassment law permeates all antidiscrimination statutes. “Everyone is supposed to rely upon his
or her subjective feelings to decide whether a comment by a
professor or a fellow student is unwelcome, and therefore
grounds for a harassment claim. Emotional reasoning is now
accepted as evidence.”20
While there are multiple sides to the safe space and
campus speech discussions, and these debates have an impact
16

Abby Jackson, "Depression Is No Longer the No. 1 Mental-health
Concern among College Students." Business Insider, June 2, 2015.
17
Andrea Peterson, "Students Flood College Mental-Health Centers,"
The Wall Street Journal October 10, 2016.
18
Peterson, 2016
19
Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015
20
Lukianoff and Haidt, 2015
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on university policy and even federal legislation, the majority
of conversation surrounding this issue within the public sphere
has been unsophisticated and polarized by political affiliations.
Opponents of the proliferation of safe spaces and trigger
warnings claim that their prevalence on college campuses
prevent students from growing intellectually because they
prevent students from encountering ideas that make them
uncomfortable. Proponents of the creation of safe spaces and
the use of trigger warnings see them as methods that actually
allow for a more diverse and sincere exchange of ideas within
classrooms because they respect students’ multiple backgrounds. Responding to The New York Times’ August 2016
article on the University of Chicago acceptance letter, three
recent alums of peer Ivy League institutions claim that trigger
warnings are a necessity on campuses and that Dean Ellison
fundamentally misunderstands the purpose of trigger warnings.21 An article by The Washington Post, published in May of
2016, asks local college students to discuss “the new language
of protest” by explaining what the cultural buzzwords mean to
them as individuals. When asked how they respond to the
sentiment that millennials are coddled one student retorted: “I
don’t think that respecting people’s existence is coddling, to be
very frank.” 22
Clearly the contemporary controversy over campus
speech and speech regulation is not novel. The University of
Chicago class of 2020 acceptance letter is not particularly novel
either. The letter is not unique in substance when compared to
other texts in the current public debate about campus speech
policy, “politically correct culture,” or student well-being and
activism. When analyzing the content, the text simply condemns trigger warnings and safe spaces. Official statements
21

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/opinion/sunday/free-speechon-campus.html?_r=0 (accessed November 21, 2016)
22
Teddy Amenabar, "The New Language of Protest." Washington
Post May 19, 2016.
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from other institutions of higher education have been just as
firm in their approval of these policies. Rather, the University
of Chicago letter is unique in stylistic structure and in its
appeals of authority. The acceptance letter format represents an
unprecedented “insider’s view” of campus speech policy.
Whereas previous prominent texts have occurred entirely
outside of the academy or entirely within, this latest text blurs
the lines between university and public audiences, claiming
authority in both realms.
The letter serves first and foremost as a traditional acceptance letter to incoming students from the echelons of the
university administration. The intended primary audience (the
students) first read this text in April or May of 2016, a full two
to three months before the letter was widely circulated in media
outlets and showcased to a general news-consuming public.
Although this text is unique within the current public sphere’s
body of work addressing campus speech and safe spaces in the
21st century, it is not novel, historically speaking. The University of Chicago letter is the latest text in over 50 years of discussion concerning free speech and speech regulation in American
colleges. This text’s importance lies more in how it condemns
safe spaces and trigger warnings, more so than the act of
condemnation.
Not Your Average Acceptance Letter:
The Rhetorical Situation of the Text
In addition to the cultural situation, the University of
Chicago acceptance letter resides in a rhetorical situation where
constraints of genre, audience, and exigence apply to the text.
Various components of the rhetorical situation indicate that the
University of Chicago letter differs from the broader body of
work in the public sphere surrounding the discussion of safe
spaces and speech on college campuses.
As far as timing goes, Dean Ellison, the speaker in the
letter and presumed author, is a newcomer to the University of

9
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Chicago administration. Dean Ellison joined the university’s
administration in July of 2014, just before the start of a new
academic year.23 His previous work was at Harvard University
where he was an Associate Dean and a professor of near eastern
languages and cultures.24 Although the letter is not his first act
as dean of the college, it is the first to make headlines outside of
the University of Chicago and broader higher education circles.
The letter might also be Dean Ellison’s first letter to incoming
students since his arrival at the college.
There are structural constraints to the text. As an acceptance letter, Dean Ellison’s message must be formal (mailed
in an era of email efficiency), short, and plain-styled. However,
other constraints guide the structure of the letter as well. The
language is clear in outlining the University of Chicago’s goals
and firm in disapproving of safe spaces and trigger warnings
because the text is intended for more than one audience. The US
News & World Report Higher Education section ranked the
University of Chicago as the third best university in the nation
for the 2017 edition of their annual report.25 Additionally,
according to the university’s student newspaper, The Chicago
Maroon, the undergraduate college accepted its lowest percentage of applicants for the 2020 class (out of the largest application pool) in its history. The college only admitted 7.9 percent
of 31,411 students who had applied.26 The University of
Chicago’s preeminence means these genre norms will be
especially scrutinized by undecided students and a press eager
to spotlight nascent trends from university leaders. Dean
23

Alice Xiao, "Dean Ellison Holds Fireside Chat." The Chicago
Maroon January 30, 2015.
24
Ibid.
25
US News & World Report “Best National Universities”:
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/bestcolleges/rankings/national-universities (accessed December, 3 2016).
26
Payton Alie, “University Admits Record Low 7.9 Percent to Class
of 2020.” The Chicago Maroon May 31, 2016.
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Ellison probably understood this when the letters were signed
and mailed. While incoming students were intended recipients,
the letter was probably penned with the intent of one day
circulating broadly in a news cycle.
The two audiences for Dean Ellison’s text are both mediated and a disparate collection of individuals rather than a
unified group reading the text together; however, the audiences
differ in every other respect. The primary audience for the text
was the group of graduating high school students who received
the acceptance letter. This collection of individuals received
their letters in the spring of 2016 and the text appears to serve
its genre’s purpose as an acceptance letter welcoming students
to the university. The second audience is the collection of
administrators and faculty at peer institutions who received the
text through digital copies that were flanked with news commentary in late August of 2016. The letter distinguishes the
University of Chicago from peers that either do not have a firm
stance on campus speech and safe spaces or have a stance in the
opposite direction. For example, the dean of Yale’s undergraduate college expressed the college’s commitment to safe spaces
in a December 2015 Q&A style interview with TIME magazine:
Students calling for a safe space are not saying they
want their classroom to be a safe space. They know the
class is going to be a place to push and be pushed,
where unusual or different ideas are going to be put
out there and they have to wrestle with them.27

27

Tessa Berenson and Haley Sweetland Edwards, “Exclusive: Yale’s
Dean Defends ‘Safe Spaces’ Amid Campus Protests.” Time, December 9, 2015.
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The interview followed a widely circulated scandal about
cultural appropriation and policing self-expression surrounding
an email about Halloween costumes at Yale.28
The first audience for the University of Chicago text
appears to be a non-rhetorical one. Accepted students, especially since they are not a unified audience beyond the common
thread of their age and academic achievement, cannot respond
effectively to the text or the exigence behind it. They can accept
the policy of their new academic home or they can reject the
policy either by refusing to attend the institution or challenge it
once arriving to campus in the fall. The second audience is
rhetorical, although it is not addressed directly by the speaker in
the text. Peer institutions can respond to the text: they can
affirm or condemn the University of Chicago’s action and they
can change their own policies, given enough time.
Why would there be a secondary rhetorical audience
for this text? The University of Chicago has been lauded as a
model for free expression and speech policy in higher education
in the United States. Shortly after the text of the letter was
widely spread among media outlets in August of 2016, the
Editorial Board of The Chicago Tribune declared the “U. Of
Chicago is the University of Common Sense.”29 Earlier, in
September of 2015, the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education (FIRE), a nonprofit educational foundation and
advocacy group, announced a partnership with the University
of Chicago to encourage other American higher education
institutions to adopt free expression policies modeled off of the
Chicago institution.30 One goal of circulating this text in
28

Liam Stack, "Yale’s Halloween Advice Stokes a Racially Charged
Debate." The New York Times November 8, 2015.
29
The Chicago Tribune Editorial Board, "Why the U. of Chicago Is
the University of Common Sense."
Chicagotribune.com August 26, 2016.
30
"FIRE Launches Campaign in Support of University of Chicago
Free Speech Statement." FIRE. September 28, 2015.
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mainstream media, a more visible venue than the institution’s
obscure academic policy webpage or partnering nonprofits’
websites, is to encourage the letter’s secondary, rhetorical
audience to change their behavior. Lastly, an influential group
that appears to have been left out of both the rhetorical audience and the role of speaker for the text is the faculty at the
University of Chicago. According to a letter from a University
of Chicago associate professor of history in response to a New
York Times article about the text, the faculty was not made
aware of Dean Ellison’s statement before the letter was mailed.
In fact “the first that members of the University of Chicago
faculty learned of the letter on speech policy issued by Chicago’s dean of students, John Ellison, was from newspapers” in
August.31 The omission of faculty, from the roles of both
speaker and audience, is pertinent because of the dominant
theme of unified community within the University of Chicago
acceptance letter.
The final component of the rhetorical situation is the
strong commitment by the University of Chicago to free
expression amid the November 2015 uncertainties for free
speech in higher education, an exigence that goaded multiple
responses by the university. The University of Chicago’s
Committee on Freedom of Expression has compiled statements
pertaining to academic freedom of faculty and students since
1995 and published them on their website.32 The committee,
formed in July of 2014 by the president and provost, was tasked
with creating a vision statement “reflecting the University’s
commitment to and tolerance of multiple forms of free expres-

31

Stanley, 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/opinion/
sunday/free-speech-on-campus.html?_r=0> (accessed November 21,
2016)
32
University of Chicago, <https://freeexpression.uchicago.edu/
page/statements-and-messages> (accessed November 21, 2016)
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sion.”33 The committee issued their statement on January 1st of
2015. A portion of it reads:
Although members of the University community are
free to criticize and contest the views expressed on
campus, and to criticize and contest speakers who are
invited to express their views on campus, they may not
obstruct or otherwise interfere with the freedom of
others to express views they reject or even loathe.34
Given the history of free expression and free speech at
the University of Chicago, the recent acceptance letter appears
to just build on previous work within the institution. There is
one important caveat though: the letter from Dean Ellison is the
first text in this body of internal documents to explicitly
mention, much less condemn, trigger warnings and intellectual
safe spaces. Additionally, the letter is directed to a primary
audience of incoming members of the University of Chicago
community; all other statements on campus speech compiled by
the committee are directed to a primary audience of community
members who have already been assimilated into the University
of Chicago group. The text clearly responds to the broader
cultural exigence beyond the University of Chicago by adopting
the broader culture’s significant language to share the institution’s message of free expression to new and disparate audiences through the unconventional medium of a college acceptance
letter.
33

Robert J. Zimmer and Eric D. Isaacs. "President Robert J. Zimmer
and Provost Eric D. Isaacs: Letter to Campus." UChicago News.
September 25, 2014.
34
Geoffrey Stone, Marianne Bertrand, Angela Olinto, Mark Siegler,
David Strauss, Kenneth Warren, and Amanda Woodward. Report of
the Committee on Freedom of Expression. University of Chicago.
Accessed November 21, 2016.
https://provost.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/FO
ECommitteeReport.pdf (accessed November 21, 2016)
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Community Freedom is more important than You:
Ideographs and Authority within the Text
At first glance the University of Chicago acceptance
letter does not appear to be a rhetorical text. The language is
brusque and the style is low and instructional, even bureaucratic. One could read the text as a crash course in speech policy
for an incoming member of the university community. However, there are subtle persuasive appeals working behind the
scenes to establish an argument about the validity of the
University of Chicago’s speech policy. Within the University of
Chicago acceptance letter there are dominant ideographs that
present separate juxtapositions of individual liberty and group
conformity. The ideograph of <freedom> establishes a dichotomy between the University of Chicago’s policies and those
supporting trigger warnings and safe spaces. The secondary
terms of <trigger warnings> and <safe spaces> also serve as
ideographs, albeit negative ones. The ideograph of <community> juxtaposes current members of the University of Chicago
community (“we”) with the intended primary audience, the
high school student to whom the letter is addressed (“you”).
This final ideograph further guides the structure of the text in
terms of pronoun usage, direct address, and active versus
passive verbs. When the University of Chicago text is compared with others within the genre of college acceptance letters,
elements of choice and agency common to other acceptance
letters are absent. All of these components converge into a
subtly persuasive text that prevents the primary and secondary
audiences from challenging the assumptions about community,
speech, and speech policies that the text presents.
The ideographs of <freedom> and <community> are
widespread throughout the acceptance letter. <Freedom,> as it
is presented in the text, concerns “academic freedom,”35
35

Ellison, 2016, lines 12, 22, and 23
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freedom of “inquiry and expression,”36 and freedom to “espouse ideas”37 or “exchange” ideas.38 The term is presented
nine times within the letter and is present in every paragraph
except the first and last ones. The emphasis on freedom, a
positive ideograph within American culture, is juxtaposed with
the discussion of safe spaces and trigger warnings in the third
paragraph:
our commitment to academic freedom means we do
not support so-called ‘trigger warnings,’ we do not
cancel invited speakers because their topics might
prove controversial, and we do not condone the creation of intellectual ‘safe spaces’ where individuals can
retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their
own.39 [italics added]
This is the only time trigger warnings and safe spaces
are mentioned. Despite their relative absence compared to
<freedom> these terms are no less powerful as ideographs that
dominate the text. According to Michael McGee, who first
theorized ideographic criticism, “an ideograph is always
understood in its relation to another.”40 Under the dichotomous
relationship established in the text, the University of Chicago’s
policy is “good” because it supports “freedom” and the alternative of trigger warnings and safe spaces are “bad” because they
do not. However, trigger warnings and intellectual safe spaces
are not explicitly defined in the text and as such they almost
function as empty signifiers, taking on whatever meaning a
36

Ellison, 2016, lines 6, 7, and 8
Ellison, 2016, line 18
38
Ellison, 2016, line 16
39
Ellison, 2016, lines 12 - 15
40
Michael Calvin McGee, "The “ideograph”: A Link Between
Rhetoric and Ideology." Quarterly Journal of Speech 66, no. 1
(February 1980): 14.
37
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reader wishes. The only definition the reader receives about
these concepts is that they allow individuals to “retreat from
ideas and perspectives at odds with their own.” If this were
always the case, then why would comparable American
institutions like Yale support safe spaces and trigger warnings?
The fact that neither the “bad” trigger warnings or safe spaces
are explicitly defined, especially because they are more
ambiguous terms than freedom, presents a troubling dichotomy
that does not allow for an alternative interpretation of these
policies where they are not antithetical to the goals of higher
education.
<Community,> as it is presented in the text, concerns
the University of Chicago both as a monolithic group and
individual “members”41 within the group. The term “our
community” is presented twice while “members of our community” is presented three times. The pronouns “our” and “we” are
more frequent, appearing in every paragraph of the text except
the last one. The emphasis on community, both through explicit
naming of the term and through collective pronouns, is juxtaposed with the direct address towards the primary audience.
Throughout the text, “our” and “we” is paired with “you,” the
teenaged recipient of the acceptance letter. For example:
You will find that we expect members of our community to be engaged in rigorous debate, discussion, and
even disagreement. At times this may challenge you
and even cause discomfort.42 [italics added]
This example indicates that the “you” is secondary to
the “we” of the <community>. The “you,” an incoming
member of the community, is expected to conform to the
community norms, even (or especially) when they “cause
41
42

Ellison, 2016, lines 7, 8, 10, and 18
Ellison, 2016, lines 9 - 11
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discomfort.” Whereas the collective pronouns appear in almost
every paragraph, “you” is noticeably absent from paragraphs
three through five, which discuss trigger warnings, the goal of
diversity within the community, and the history of the University of Chicago’s “debate, and even scandal, resulting from our
commitment to academic freedom.”43 The non-direct address
within this section is understandable, since these paragraphs
outline community norms. However, this central section is also
the only section of the entire text that uses verbs of stasis rather
than active verbs. The fourth paragraph has no human actor.
The subjects are concepts, not people such as “we” or “you.”
This paragraph features emotional appeals and actions to
support community goals that have yet to be fulfilled. “Diversity...is a fundamental strength of our community,” line 17 reads.
But who will ensure that the community is in fact diverse in
“opinion and background?”44 “The members of our community
must have the freedom to espouse and explore...ideas;” but who
will work to guarantee that freedom?45 The lack of “you”
pronouns represents a shift away from directly addressing the
primary audience. The removal of active verbs in this section of
the text persuades the reader to enter a type of contract where
they fill in the blanks left by the text. In order for the “you” to
join the “we,” the reader must become the actor that ensures the
community’s goals of diversity and freedom are met, or at the
very least does not impede the community from ensuring the
goals are met. The sentences in paragraph four also appeal to
the reader to act on the virtuous ideographs presented in the
text. The accepted student should uphold standards of <freedom> – by rejecting trigger warnings and safe spaces – to
support the <community>.
Compared to other university acceptance letters, the
University of Chicago text diverges from genre norms in two
43

Ellison, 2016, line 23
Ellison, 2016, line 17
45
Ellison, 2016, line 18-19
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18

Amanda Richey

significant ways. The University of Chicago letter does not
assume that the primary reader, the graduating high school
senior, might choose a different college or university to
continue their education, nor does it include relevant supplementary information like an “Accepted Students Day” date or
final deposit deadline for enrollment. For example, a 2013
Washington Post article on American college acceptance letters
included 10 examples of elite Eastern Seaboard universities’
acceptance and denial letters for the class of 2017.46 Half of the
acceptance letters included language that implied that the
student’s choice to attend college at the institution they were
accepted into was not final. An acceptance letter from MIT
explicitly stated, “You’ll likely have offers of admission from
many fine schools, but we hope that you’ll choose to enroll at
MIT.” Additionally, nine of the 10 acceptance letters included
important dates for students, such as final deposit deadlines and
days to visit campus with peer accepted students. While these
10 institutions are hardly representative of the letters sent
annually by hundreds of universities across the United States,
they do represent norms for the genre: a conciliation that the
reader has agency in accepting or rejecting the school and some
basic guidance in the form of “next steps” to fulfill that agency.
The absence of an appeal to students to finalize their decision
further emphasizes the dominance of <community> in the text.
The language assumes that the student reading the letter is
already a neophyte member of the University of Chicago and
that he or she will not reject this community by choosing to
“continue [their] intellectual journey” somewhere else.47 The
last line of the University of Chicago letter says it best: “See
you in September!”48 Additionally, the fact that the University
46

Richardson, Linch, and Anderson, March 31, 2013.
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/local/university-acceptanceand-denial-letters/86/ (accessed December, 3 2016).
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Ellison, 2016, line 4
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of Chicago letter does not address practical “next steps” for
students represents a framing device that reveals the text’s
secondary audience of administrators at peer institutions. There
is no need to discuss the logistics behind the transition from
high school to college because the secondary audience does not
need this information. The practicality of choosing a college
and the logistical steps that accompany it are eclipsed by the
prominence of <freedom> and <community> and their implications for campus speech within the text. The text appears to
follow the constraints of the college acceptance letter genre
merely in the length of the letter and in language presented in
the first and final paragraphs congratulating the recipient for
acceptance into the University of Chicago community. In this
way, the expected genre of a college acceptance letter “brackets” the actual text concerning <freedom,> <community,> and
speech.
The prevalence of culturally “good” ideographs and the
juxtapositions between <freedom> and trigger warnings and
safe spaces as well as between “we the community” and “you
the incoming student” creates a virtuous authoritarian tone. The
community within the University of Chicago is upholding the
important cultural value of freedom by condemning trigger
warnings and safe spaces, even if incoming members of the
community want these policies. The work that the reader
participates in to “fill in the blanks” left by static verbs in
paragraph four reinforces the authority of the community.
Further, the lack of agency conceded to the reader in choosing a
college, arguably a genre norm for college acceptance letters,
completes this work to assert authority. However, all of these
components pertain to the primary audience of accepted high
school students. The same authoritarian tone applies to the
secondary rhetorical audience of administrators at peer institutions. Without considering the “we” versus “you” juxtaposition
the authoritarian tone is not as evident, but the prevalence of
<freedom,> and its juxtaposition with trigger warnings and safe
spaces, is not contingent on a designated audience. The
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emphasis on <freedom,> an ideograph with very positive and
powerful connotations in American society, and the assertion
that “one of the University of Chicago’s defining characteristics
is our commitment to freedom of inquiry and expression” still
aligns the speaker in the text to a culturally entrenched moral
superiority and the authority that stems from it.49 This authority
is conveyed whether the audience is subordinate to the University of Chicago community, as an incoming college student, or
on the same level of the hierarchy, as a member of a peer
institution of higher education. The prevalence of ideographs
and their moral undercurrents, the juxtapositions these ideographs present as well as the structure of pronoun usage, direct
address, and active language all establish a text that might
prevent audience members from questioning the claims the text
presents about speech and community.
Merging Publics’ Understanding of Campus Speech:
Why This Letter Matters
It may be too early to tell the effect that the University
of Chicago acceptance letter had on the intended audiences or
on the broader debate addressing safe spaces and free speech on
college campuses. However, media response in the three
months since the letter was circulated broadly among a general
American public indicate the wider importance of this text to
the current cultural moment.
According to Google Trends, both the terms “trigger
warnings” and “safe space” saw an increase in popularity on the
search engine during the week of August 21st to 28th 2016, the
same week that NPR, The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, and other major news outlets released coverage on the
University of Chicago acceptance letter.50 “Trigger warning”
49
50

Ellison, 2016, lines 5-6
Google Trends. Accessed November 21, 2016.
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saw peak popularity during this week for the first time in a
decade, whereas the popularity for “safe space” was at 53
percent popularity, with peak popularity in the fall of 2015,
according to the Google Trends website on November 21st.
When comparing the two cultural buzzwords with the term
“University of Chicago letter,” there was a correlation in
increases in popularity in August of 2016 (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Popularity of terms “trigger warning” (in blue) “university of
chicago letter” (in red), and “safe space” (in yellow) from November 27,
2011 to November 21, 2016. Accessed November 21, 2016.

The University of Chicago letter gained this prominence by addressing separate audiences (higher education
institution communities and general news-reading publics)
through the novel medium of a college acceptance letter and by
adopting significant, though relatively abstract, vocabulary. The
letter went one step beyond previous literature concerning safe
spaces and speech regulation to offer unique perspectives to
each audience. Laypeople consuming the text through the news
cycle gained an “insider’s view” of the college admissions
process while peer institutions and incoming student members
of the University of Chicago community saw freedom of
expression and campus speech policy defined against intellectual safe spaces and trigger warnings. This dual address to
distinct audiences merged the segmented readers into one
public unified by the act of reading the letter. Apart from this
common ground, however, the readers diverged on their
opinions concerning the purpose behind the letter and the
University of Chicago’s speech policy itself.
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Apart from the merging of audiences into a unified
public, the text’s structure also presents a persuasive appeal to
prevent the reader from questioning the philosophical assumptions made in the text. The adoption of culturally significant
ideographs and buzzwords beyond the institution’s internal
speech policy vocabulary allowed the text to gain prominence
in the news cycle. When paired with the virtuous authoritarian
tone of the letter, it further entrenches the broader cultural
narrative of safe spaces as a dangerous and pervasive threat to
higher education that must be stopped. The letter does not allow
for any questioning of what is meant by “intellectual safe
space” or why this term is in opposition to <freedom>. When
this persuasive appeal is pushed beyond an insular university
community into a politically polarized cultural situation, it
further justifies the staunch opinions on either side of the issue,
without fostering informed or sophisticated discussion. By
failing to define common, relatively abstract terms in the text,
advocates of safe spaces and trigger warnings can assert that
Dean Ellison doesn’t know what he’s talking about in the
acceptance letter. By creating a dichotomy between these
speech policies and the unquestionable virtue of freedom,
opponents of safe spaces and trigger warnings can assert a
moral high ground, using the letter to justify their claims. Either
way, the text creates a wall of authority that buttresses against
engaging the “other side;” it functions to merely reinforce
beliefs about the necessity or danger of certain speech policies.
While it remains to be seen whether the University of Chicago
acceptance letter to the Class of 2020 will have this effect – or
any lasting effect, for that matter – on the broader contemporary fascination with speech and its regulation on college
campuses, the unique structure of the text, its subtle persuasive
appeals, and its emergence in a time marked by social polarization suggest that this is not the last time we will see the merging
of the academy and the broader media market. The implications
of this merge, particularly on complex topics like academic
freedom, speech, and identity, are pertinent. Letters like this
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one seem to not only frame accepted students as fated customers, but also seek out mediated audiences that will polarize the
discourse of college around unnecessary, empty buzzwords
linked to central political ideographs of freedom and speech.
However, there are much better spaces to discuss the words and
symbols that will “never hurt us” than a college acceptance
letter.
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WILLFUL IGNORANCE, EMBODIMENT,
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF SYMPATHY:
J.M. COETZEE ON ANIMAL CRUELTY
THROUGH FICTIONAL INTERLOCUTORS

Erin Mellor

Many animal rights activists agree that pain is universally felt, spanning human-animal barriers to encompass all
living, or embodied, things. Elizabeth Costello, the aging
female novelist central to J. M. Coetzee’s novella, utilizes a
series of metaphors in her lecture The Philosophers and the
Animals to compare animal suffering to human suffering.
Coetzee uses the character of Costello as a lens for addressing
the ethical boundaries of horror and what it means to not only
be cognizant of immense suffering, but to willfully ignore
“places of death” as an entire community.1 I will explore the
ethical boundary between human suffering and animal cruelty
as seen in the metaphors presented by Coetzee’s Costello in her
first lecture, The Philosophers and the Animals: the comparison
of the meat industry to the Third Reich, and mass animal
slaughter to the Nazi death camps. It is too reductionist to claim
that Costello is a stand-in for Coetzee, yet they share similar
life experiences and a pessimistic outlook on the ability of
society to progress. The latter distances himself from his own
beliefs by utilizing fictional interlocutors, allowing for an
expansive examination of the multiplicities inherent in hege-
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J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 35.
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monic evaluations of suffering, the nonpower inherent in
power.2
Is it ethical, from a philosophical standpoint as well as
a literary one, to draw upon the horrors of the Holocaust in a
metaphor referencing the mass slaughter of animals? Are there
specific moments in history that are too appalling and deeply
personal to ever appropriately use as a point of comparison in a
contemporary argument? Coetzee clearly takes the issue of
human mistreatment of animals seriously, as his protagonist’s
chosen metaphorics equate human cruelty towards animals with
the calculated murder of millions of Jews in the Holocaust.
Coetzee presented his pseudo-lecture, the novella itself, at the
1997-98 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, both revealing and veiling his opinions on the way human beings treat
animals in our capitalistic society.3 Through Costello’s chosen
metaphors, we see Coetzee’s own moral opprobrium with the
meat industry, as well as his understanding of how audiences,
representative of society in microcosm, perceive and respond to
his arguments. The comparison between the victims of fascism
and factory farms is not inherently objectionable when in the
form of a literary device, solely because figurative devices in
literature do not carry a burden of proof. They are meant to
illustrate an idea, not substantiate it. It is too simple to claim
that the comparison lessens the tragedy of the Holocaust and
the pain felt; in fact, this line of reasoning precludes the
2

Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to
Follow),” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002): 396. Derrida explores
multiple questions with the reader on the ability of animals to feel
suffering. He asks, “What of the vulnerability felt on the basis of this
inability? What is this nonpower at the heart of power? What is its
quality of modality? How should one account for it? What right
should be accorded it? To what extent does it concern us? Being able
to suffer is no longer a power, it is a possibility without power, a
possibility of the impossible.” I think it is productive to engage the
possibility that Coetzee used his lecture to respond to Derrida’s ideas.
3
Amy Gutmann, introduction to The Lives of Animals, ed. J. M.
Coetzee (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3.
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acknowledgment that animals have souls and can thus suffer.
However, what metrics exist for measuring the ethical applicability of figurative language, the level of sensitivity surrounding
historically charged words and phrases? In what ways does
Coetzee himself escape culpability because he presents the
comparison through the words of a fictional lecturer?
Costello’s metaphor in her lecture The Philosophers
and Animals, while controversial, aptly illuminates the tragedy
of the meat industry. It helps underline the gravity of how
humans oppress nonhuman animals and escape culpability.
However, one reason Costello’s metaphor is so shocking—and
can be argued insensitive—is because she does not assure her
audience of the ways in which her comparison could be
perceived as offensive. She fails to address the ways in which
history integrates itself into present discussions, so that the
Holocaust is not less important because it happened in the past
and cannot be reconciled (as the meat industry of the present
day can.) Her fatal flaw is in replacing an equal sign with a
greater than sign, claiming that the meat industry is worse than
what the Third Reich unrolled. She states that “an enterprise of
degradation, cruelty, and killing” exists that “rivals anything
that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it” (21).4
However, Costello does not discomfit her audience because this correlation is ungrounded, or because she does not
qualify her subject matter enough. Rather, Costello’s lecture
makes her audience uncomfortable because it “breaks with the
expected academic norms” thus provoking “awkward emotional
exchanges” as pointed out by Frances Mascia-Lees, an American anthropologist.5 We can see this in the decisive letter
Abraham Stern, a professor at Appleton College, sends to
Costello, calling her out for trading “on the horrors of the
camps in a cheap way” and insulting “the memory of the dead”
4

Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 21.
Frances E. Mascia-Lees and Patricia Sharpe, “Introduction to
Cruelty, Suffering, Imagination: The Lessons of J. M. Coetzee”
American Anthropologist 108 (2006): 84.
5
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(50).6 Coetzee presents us with a protagonist who addresses her
audience directly, claiming no pretense. She deviates from
polite conversation with an apology that sounds much more like
an indictment, asking her audience to “pardon the tastelessness
of the following” before theorizing about the body fat of
Treblinka’s victims being used as in ingredient in soap (2122).7 We are so shocked by her words that we cannot process
the greater meaning behind them. The metaphor falls flat.
From a historical point of view, Costello’s metaphor is
appropriate. According to Boria Sax, the term “Holocaust”
originally denoted “a Hebrew sacrifice in which the entire
animal was given to Yahweh to be consumed with fire” (156).8
In a weird twist, a form of animal exploitation—animal killed
for spiritual offering—became the chosen metaphor for the
murder of millions of Jews by the Nazi Germans. The very term
“Holocaust” alludes to and denotes animal suffering. And if
literature seeks to illuminate the human experience and the
ways in which we move through the world, metaphors help
elucidate what lies within us. David Sztybel, a philosopher
specializing in animal ethics, wrote an intriguing essay defending the metaphor of the Holocaust victims to animals in the
meat industry. He claims that in asking if we dare point out “the
chilling similarities between how Jews were treated in the
Holocaust and how animals are treated in the present day” we
are really asking if human beings are of “superior moral
significance relative to nonhuman animals” (98).9 Sztybel’s
selected similarities stand the test: displacement, separation
from family, voicelessness, unfathomable amount of deaths,
namelessness, transported in confined places, and a disowning
of responsibility by the perpetrators, coupled with conditioned
6

Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 50.
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indifference. This removes the systems of power that we see in
differentiating “man” from “animal” and replaces both with the
identifier of sufferer. And yet, instead of enumerating the
horrors of the meat industry and its procedures, Costello
discusses facts about the Holocaust and leaves it up to those in
attendance to draw the parallels, the very people she earlier
notes whom can only “comprehend the deaths of others” by
thinking of the victims “one at a time” (19).10
Audience members at The Philosophers and the Animals lecture view Elizabeth Costello as removed from society,
entertaining if not completely delusional. She does not really
have much power in effecting change or elevating her audience
to the state of heightened moral awareness that she herself
inhabits because her uncomfortable pauses and alarming
analogies alienate her. Thus, we see a correlation between an
escalated sensitivity to animal abuse and a fall in social status,
as Costello moves from expert to outcast, celebrated to criticized, influential to delusional. An element of attenuated
agency exists within each listener, as they can visually see what
happens to someone who has such an extreme aversion to the
meat industry and its practices—you will be seen as strange,
incoherent, and disorganized.
This begs the question, why did Coetzee make Costello
his protagonist? Why give her such a weak voice, a voice that
lacks gravitas and conviction in making her case against animal
cruelty? An art critic, Ward Jones, argues that the main lesson
of The Lives of Animals is how “the portrait that we have of an
ethical informant” can contribute to the way we evaluate the
argument at hand (209).11 Costello begins her lecture asking her
audience to “concede” to her “the rhetorical power to evoke
these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force”
which is ironic as she is relatively powerless in evoking a good
10

Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 19.
Ward E. Jones, “Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral
Philosopher,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2011):
209.
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response (19).12 Why does Coetzee choose a voice that is
elderly, scattered, and alarmist as the instrument for perpetuating his ideas? I agree with the literature arguing that “fictional
narratives can possess ethical authority” but think that the
choice to make that ethical authority questionable is an ingenious ploy by Coetzee (209).13 Costello’s weak authority and
flaws as a public speaker reflect the thoughts of an author who
knows that his position is trivialized in and disruptive to
popular thought. This shows that Coetzee does not believe
society can recognize the severity or extent of this kind of mass
cruelty and change. He concedes to the moral apathy of humans
and the limited potential for an expansion of human empathy
for animals, as they are non-human and thus other. Coetzee
identifies with the futility of serving as a moral persuader, and
turns to the use of interlocutors to stir the pot for him, to present
ideas that resonate with both the pedagogue and the participant.
Coetzee develops these interlocutors to start a conversation on the concept of cruelty. If pain is a universal sensation
felt, then cruelty inflicted on an animal is just as horrific as
cruelty inflicted on a human. What does it mean to be a conduit
capable of inflicting suffering and cruelty on other living
creatures? It is hard to answer this question because a “uniform
or ubiquitous cross-cultural concept of ‘cruelty’ towards
animals” does not exist (129).14 While global watchdogs for
human rights operate around commonly accepted ideals of
morality and justice, international organizations protecting the
rights of animals find it much harder to make universal claims,
as there is no cross-cultural acceptance of where animals stand
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in relation to humans. But what if we are not in the position of
pain-inflictor, but in the position of pain-witness?
Costello makes it clear that the Germans who “lived in
the countryside” around the Nazi death camps “could not afford
to know” what took place within the camps (19).15 They
rejected a reality that was too painful to accept. But she does
not disparage these people as uniquely immoral—rather, their
actions were reflective of the average German citizen. Camps
covered the Reich like sores. Just as the majority of Americans
live in close proximity to places where meat is produced,
distributed, or sold, Costello argues “few Germans lived more
than a few kilometers from a camp of some kind” (20).16
Evidence of immense cruelty and horror was in the air, swirled
across some pathway of the conscious, even if it could not be
fully explicated or clearly labeled. Costello claims that humans
utilize ignorance as a survival mechanism when faced with
mass-scale suffering. The actions of the Germans behind the
camp were so appalling that the average German citizen needed
to disassociate in order to keep his or her sanity. They chose to
be willfully ignorant.
Costello’s lecture is ultimately an appeal to examine
how human beings sympathize, or refuse to sympathize, with
those they do not identify with, those that remain in the
ambiguous category of other—or, more aptly—nonhuman.
Costello associates willful ignorance with a purposeful refusal
to acknowledge embodied-beings. She claims that merely being
alive “is to be a living soul” (33).17 Thus, animals, a domain
encompassing human beings, all possess embodied souls.
Through her dialogue on embodiment, we see glimpses of
Coetzee’s philosophy emerging. He urges the reader to
acknowledge that the majority of individuals fail to recognize
the capacity of all embodied things to suffer, just as the
fictional lecture attendees fail to recognize the magnitude of
15
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Costello’s argument. Jacques Derrida explores the idea of an
animal’s ability to suffer. If humans are the agents in power,
and they define what is nonhuman, than asking the question,
“Can animals suffer?” is analogous to asking if animals can not
be able to suffer. He further probes, to what extent should we
be concerned with the ability of an animal to suffer, if “being
able to suffer is no longer a power” but a “possibility without
power” (396).18 Would not animals gain superiority over man if
they were unable to suffer? And yet, this cannot be true. And it
is problematic if individuals recognize this capacity to suffer. If
an individual recognizes the capacity of all embodied things—
creatures with a heart and soul—to suffer, then cruelty gains
more weight. Animal cruelty moves from a necessary evil,
something you grimace at but continue to ignore, to a grave
injustice that requires action. Suddenly, the confinement of
animals stuffed into boxes, pens, coops, and cages becomes as
glaringly offensive as the confinement of humans in cattle cars.
I want to extend Coetzee’s thinking and propose that
Costello misses something crucial by making this a binary
response—sympathizing or refusing to sympathize. A variety of
obstacles to human sympathy for suffering exist: not knowing,
willfully not knowing (as Costello highlights), compassion
fatigue (the inability to invest the tremendous emotional energy
that sympathy requires for every injustice), and apathy from the
feeling of impotence in the face of overwhelming injustice or
cruelty. Therefore, a lack of sympathy is not always a psychological defense on behalf of the person witnessing suffering. I
believe people consciously or unconsciously place their
psychological suffering on one scale with the ethical behavior
they wish they could exhibit on the other scale. The scale tips
towards the heavier desire. By ignoring all of these nuances,
Costello simplifies the problem of animal cruelty to a point that
can be easily dismissed by her audience. They perceive her
points as both radical and irrelevant. This failure on Costello’s
part makes me question Coetzee’s viewpoint, as he created
18
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Costello’s failure. Perhaps if we can recognize the earnestness
in which Costello believes her moral knowledge to be true, we
can also empathize with the frustration of a fruitless mission
and the inability to will a group to action. And yet, identifying
with Costello proves exceedingly challenging.
Costello’s Holocaust metaphor, if it is to be viewed as a
vehicle for illuminating commonalities, serves its purpose by
highlighting a lack of sympathy for living beings deemed
“nonhuman.” Psychologists studying anthropomorphism
elucidate this idea of nonhuman versus human by putting
humanness on a continuum. They claim that through anthropomorphism “individuals can attribute humanlike capacities to
nonhuman agents” and through dehumanization they can also
“fail to attribute these same capacities to other people” (228).19
While the former mode leads to more moral concern for the
subject, the latter incites moral detachment. This process makes
it easier to excuse immoral actions. Costello’s lecture discomfits her audience not just because it centers on an analogy to the
Holocaust, but because it suggests that human cruelty towards
other humans is no worse than human cruelty towards animals.
It is easy for us to see “animality in humans,” as most people
regard Nazi leaders in the Holocaust as morally repugnant and
thus bestial, but it is harder for us to see the “humanity in
animals” when this means an integral part of our everyday
lives—eating meat—is rooted in the suffering of fellow
creatures (130).20
Towards the end of her lecture, Costello returns to the
death camps to discuss the true horror of the Holocaust—the
inability of the German perpetrators to “think themselves into

19
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the place of their victims” that rattle away in a cattle-car (34).21
Just as the majority of Germans “closed their hearts” to the
faculty of sympathy, so does Costello’s audience fail to imagine
themselves in the body of Costello (34).22 Her own son, whose
thoughts Coetzee brings us into, thinks her lecture was a
“strange talk” both “ill gauged” and “ill argued” (36).23 He
believes she should not be there. Norma, his wife, wants to
publicly humiliate Costello by asking a malevolent question.
Costello calls for sympathy, yet we see Coetzee’s two main
characters deny her compassion. Her appeal is fruitless.
Just as the audience fails to sympathize with the speaker, so
I believe that Coetzee satirizes the proclivity of humans to cling
to ignorance rather than move to action. Costello claims that
“there are people who have the capacity to imagine themselves
as someone else” but the overwhelming majority of people
“have the capacity but choose not to exercise it” (35).24 Humans
will choose being accepted over being ostracized, even if the
choice compromises moral norms. History, as seen through the
Holocaust analogy, continues to prove that those who challenge
the status quo face ostracism while the ignorant remain safe in
their country homes. Nazi rhetoric encouraged people to reject
identifying with Jews. We are similarly conditioned to be
entirely indifferent to animal suffering as it has become an
integral part of our society, and those who reject it are cast out
as pariahs.
Coetzee proffers an indictment on Elizabeth Costello to the
reader as well. She alienates herself from her audience through
her morally superior attitude, seen in moments when she claims
that she can think her way “into the existence of a bat or a
chimpanzee or an oyster” because they “share the substrate of
life” with her (35).25 She posits herself as a witness to a
21

Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 34.
Ibid.
23
Ibid., 36.
24
Ibid., 35.
25
Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 35.
22

38

Erin Mellor

holocaust who refuses to remain silent, rendering her audience
members the German people of the countryside who witness
horror and choose willful ignorance. She claims that “each day
is a new holocaust” and yet “our moral being [remains]
untouched” and we do not “feel tainted” (35).26 Costello makes
each new day a harbinger of horrific tragedy. Each day is a new
holocaust. And each day, we shield our morality from affront,
to the point where we are inoculated against the brutality. She
suggests that her audience members are tainted—an affront to
each member’s moral code that she herself evades.
In Costello’s voice and actions, we see Coetzee the author posing the question: Does individual awareness bring
about any real change, especially if she or he takes an extremely isolating stance? There is power in his subtlety of narrative
authority, and Coetzee’s prose reflects an acute awareness of
the inherent animal suffering in the meat industry. His vision
for audience response, both the fictional audience receiving
Costello and the real audience of readers, is bleak—he packages a story in a lecture in which the majority of characters cannot
change their mindsets or expand their perspectives. Beyond
that, the individual is relatively weak in her power to effect
change, especially because Costello’s main arguments remain
rooted in a metaphor that links the meat industry to a dark,
indisputably incomprehensible moment in human history. We
think we have already been morally aroused after the horrors of
the Holocaust, and that suffering of that magnitude cannot
possibly be repeated. But just as incidents of genocide took
place before World War II with the Armenians of the Ottoman
Empire, and subsequently persisted throughout the twentieth
century in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda, so do
grave injustices against living creatures exist in the present day.
The lecture ends abruptly: “We can do anything and get
away with it… there is no punishment” (25).27 But is not the
calculated cruelty of a few at the top of the meat industry worse
26
27
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than the willful ignorance assumed by the majority of human
beings towards animal cruelty? Coetzee’s fictional scaffolding
around the subject of animal cruelty in the meat industry allows
for an inward turn; which character acts in a way I would? The
reader is privy to the scene but not participating in it. You are
not tasked with gauging your reaction because you are not
acting—you are watching. It is almost as if Coetzee presents
you with the choice between kindness and cruelty itself,
knowing you will guiltily choose the latter, but from afar. You
have the privilege of choosing from a private locale, away from
the fictional group of people in attendance. He knows you will
not change your perspective, even if a tinge of guilt leaks into
your conscious. While we do not hold the knives that slit the
throats of chickens nor press the buttons that systematically
asphyxiate cattle, we do not question how our meat reaches our
plates as perfectly symmetrical patties. When activism presses
up against alienation, humans usually choose the status quo, if
for nothing more than self-preservation. We willfully ignore the
suffering of those whom we cannot identify with, feeling
morally exempt from a murder we did not commit. For being
the animals in power, humans are quite powerless in effecting
change.
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THE CONCEPT OF ART
AND INTERACTIVE COMPUTER ART

Anhang Ning

In this digital era, computers have become an essential
component of our lives: we connect with each other via social
media, get real time news updates via the Internet, and share
music and ideas in the cloud. In the art world, interactive
computer art has emerged in response to this unique time
period. This new art form raises some interesting discussions
concerning interactivity, audience participation, and the very
medium of the computer. In the first section of this paper, I will
lay the groundwork through the aesthetic theories proposed by
Morris Weitz, George Dickie, and Immanuel Kant. Art is an
open concept, and, the audience is an important component of
an artwork. In addition, a good work of art evokes a universal
sense of delight or wonder, which is subjective in nature.
In the second section, through two major examples,
“Crossings” (2009) by Nina Yankowitz and “Boundary
Functions” (1998) by Scott Snibbe, I argue that interactive
computer art eliminates the distance between the audience and
the artwork since it demands audience participation. It outperforms traditional art forms in terms of artistic techniques,
displaying effect, and the incorporation of other disciplines. In
the end, by connecting the two sections, I argue that because
the core concepts of interactive computer art (i.e. its artistic
values, the importance of the audience, and the universal
delightfulness it evokes) are closely related to larger discussions of art, it fits in the category of art.
With the rapid development of technology and Internet,
this era with tremendous amount of information has already
surrounded us, no matter if we are ready or not. Understanding
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interactive computer art is an initial step toward making sense
of this technological era. Although the “interactivity” concept is
radically new, we ought to treat it with careful analysis instead
of careless rejection. Given that technology changes rapidly,
perhaps more radical art forms are approaching us in the near
future; we might be left behind without a sufficient understanding of the contemporary innovations of interactive computer
art.
What is Essential for the Concept of Art?
Art, given its adventurous character, is an open concept
that allows continuous modifications. Furthermore, the audience plays an essential role for the artwork, and one of the
many components of a successful artwork is that it generates
universal subjective judgments.
Unlike rigid scientific theories, the definition of art is
subject to change. Numerous efforts have been made at an allencompassing definition of art; however, the theorists ignore
the fallacy behind its logic.1 A good definition is composed of
both necessary and sufficient conditions, meaning that a theory
is true if and only if the conditions are true. However, given the
“very expansive, adventurous character of art,”—or, to put it
more simply, the examples of what count as art change continually in unpredictable ways—the definition of art lacks sufficient and necessary conditions; thus it is logically impossible to
generate a definition of art.2
All existing definitions of art have limitations, for example, formalism and expressionism. Formalists believe that the
essential property of an artwork is the combination of “plastic

1
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forms” (i.e. lines, colors, shapes and volumes)3; anything
without significant forms is repudiated from the category of
art.4 The inadequacy of formalism is obvious: it leaves out other
essential properties that constitute an artwork, such as its
historical context, emotions that it evokes, etc. The expressionist theory developed by Leo Tolstoy, is also problematic.
Emotional expression and feelings, expressionists believe, are
fundamental properties of art.5 Granted, expressionism is
applicable to many abstract paintings6, but realistic paintings
focusing on historical events or portraits do not necessarily
invoke emotional response. Because these paintings are
considered as art, the expressionist theory is thus insufficient.7
Similarly, other theories of art, such as organicist theory,
intuitionist theory, and voluntarist theory are inadequate in that
“each purports to be a complete statement about the defining
features of all works of art and yet each of them leaves out
something which the others take to be central.”8 Different
theories resemble myriad facets of a diamond; each is merely
one reflection of the whole.
Given that the existing definitions are inevitably limited,
the role of the concept of art is to describe similarities and
connections of all artworks. Attention should be shifted from
definitive theories to a descriptive account: “aestheticians,”
Weitz argues, “may lay down similarity conditions but never
necessary and sufficient ones for correct application of the
3
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concept.”9 Furthermore, when new circumstances arise in the
art world, theorists discuss whether or not the concept could be
broadened. As Weitz writes,
“Art,” itself, is an open concept. New conditions (cases)
have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly
arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which
will demand decisions on the part of those interested,
usually professional critics, as to whether the concept
should be extended or not.10
For example, John Cage’s famous piece 4’33’’ emerged as a
radical new form of art. During his performance, Cage sat in
front of the piano, without playing a single note. To determine
whether or not this is art, theorists can look at the similarities it
shares with other musical works: a three-movement composition performed in a recital. However, different from previous
works, there was complete silence throughout the performance.
Many audience members were angry about this because they
expected to hear sound during a piano performance. Cage
nevertheless believes that all sounds are equal: “not-sounds” are
not inferior to sounds.11 This piece aimed to “remind the
listener that s/he can have a satisfying musical experience only
by using his/her own ears and listening to the sounds and noises
of the environment.”12 To decide whether or not this piece is fit
for the category of art, theorists can look at its relationship with
other musical works and examining both the audience’s and
Cage’s views.
Of a profusion of attributes of art, I believe the two crucial properties are: the audience and the universality of the
9
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work. First, an artwork is seen and apprehended by viewers or
auditors; thus, the audience plays a prominent part in art.
George Dickie defines art as “an artifact of a kind created to be
presented to an artworld public.”13 An artwork is made to be
shown to members of the artworld. If Dickie were right, the
artworld public is exclusively those who have enough artistic
education, such that “the members…know how to fulfill a role
which requires knowledge and understanding similar in many
respects to that required of an artist.”14 To qualify as a member,
the individual must have an artistic background similar to the
artist’s; the common professions of the artworld public include
“critic, art teacher, director, curator, (and) conductor.”15
Although I agree with Dickie that the role of the audience is
important, I think his position on “artworld public” favors
elitism. I believe that this group can be broadened.
Many artworks have been created for mainstream audiences, not excluding those with minimal education on art. For
example, cooperating with art museums, contemporary artists
aim to present their works and values to the public. The
education of these artists’ work to the general public is precisely the reason that contemporary art museums exist. One
important step involved in museum education is creating an
explanatory label for artworks. After curators finish writing
labels, museum educators make sure that the language is
precise and simple, so that it is accessible to different audiences, including non-native speakers, children, advanced readers,
etc. In addition, a variety of tours are often organized to ensure
different groups receive suitable educational experiences,
ranging from toddler tours, school tours, to adult tours and
Spanish tours. During the opening of an exhibition, it is not
uncommon to see the artist delivering a talk to the public in
13
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many museums. From these examples, we discern that artists
and museums work hard to present the knowledge and background of the artworks to all sorts of audiences; thus Dickie’s
account on the artworld public is insufficiently inclusive.
Artistic masterpieces evoke subjective emotions in the
mind of each audience member. In his famous theory of
sublimity, Immanuel Kant emphasizes the aesthetic experience
in our mind.16 The sublime does not exist in objects; one can
only find it in the mind.17 As Steve Odin points out, Kant’s
perspective on aesthetic attitude “shift(s) from a position of
realism, which understands beauty as something only inherent
in the object, to an idealist (or, as it were, transcendental
idealist) position that underscores the contribution of the mind
in aesthetic experience.”18 In other words, far from analyzing
external features of an artwork, say, in a painting, its lines,
shapes, and colors, one assesses a work of art based on one’s
subjective judgment. As Odin writes, “human consciousness is
not simply a passive recipient: to some extent it actively
constitutes an object of beauty through various noetic operations of the mind.”19 Beauty arouses intellectual engagement.
“The beautiful,” for Kant, “is that which, apart from concepts,
is represented as the Object of a UNIVERSAL delight.”20 The
object evokes “similar delight” from all humans.21 Importantly,
an aesthetic judgment is subjective; therefore, it is “liberated
from all constraint by concepts” and it “cannot claim the
‘objective universal validity’ of a logical judgment.”22 The
concept of subjective universality may seem ambivalent at first
16

Steve Odin, Artistic Detachment in Japan and the West: Psychic
Distance in Comparative Aesthetics (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i
Press, 2011), 38.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., 39.
22
Ibid.

48

Anhang Ning

glance; however, it simply means that the beautiful, or an
exquisite work of art, can cause a similar subjective feeling for
everyone. From my understanding, what Kant means by
“similar delight” is not merely the feeling of pleasure—it rather
lies on a broader spectrum of emotions. Standing in front of a
masterful painting, for example, diverse people experience
analogous emotions, such as awe, pleasure, or even melancholy.
Interactive Computer Art
Interactive computer art offers a new mode of apprehending art. By eliminating the distance from the artwork, the
installation is more action-oriented. Visitors explore the work
through generated display. The interaction is of a relaxing kind,
since previous knowledge on the work is not required. The
medium of the computer is advantageous because: 1) it creates
the most precise shapes or the most realistic three dimensional
models, and 2) it allows modification of the work by altering
digital codes. In addition, interactive installations usually
incorporate different art forms as well as knowledge from
multiple disciplines.
Before we unpack the theories of interactive computer
art, let us first consider some examples. Displayed in Greece
and Poland in 2009, “Crossings”23 is an interactive installation
that advocates religious toleration. By incorporating sacred
texts of different religions, such as the Old Testament and the
Quran, the installation encourages the audience to explore
connections between the scriptures24 Inside the gallery, the
floor is a projection of mosaic patterns of various churches,
cathedrals, and temples around the world.25 As participants hear
religious texts in different dialects, they are invited, using the
23
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infrared wand, to drag words from religious texts appeared on
an interactive wall to an adjacent text wall. The program allows
participants to save their selection and review them on the
program’s website.
Another interactive art installation is Scott Snibbe’s
“Boundary Functions”26 (1998). “Boundary Functions”
examines the concept of personal space, over which we do not
have autonomy because of the interrelation between us and
other people.27 The artwork requires at least two participants.
An overhead projector draws lines between people: one line
between two participants, three lines between three participants.
More lines will be generated as more participants join, resulting
in the creation of cellular areas. As people move, the lines
move as well; however, a participant cannot walk outside of
his/her cellular area, or his/her “personal space.” The installation vividly shows the conflicted concepts of personal space
and society: although there is always a line, a “boundary,”
between us and other individuals, the space is impossible
without the presence of other people because, presented in the
model, the involvement of one person is not sufficient for the
creation of a “personal space.” The mathematical construction
Voronoi diagram is also used in astronomy to illustrate the
relationship between gravity and stars, and, in chemistry to
represent collections of atoms in crystals.28
Interactive computer artworks, such as “Crossings” and
“Boundary Functions,” differ from traditional art forms in that
the participant generates different displays. Dominic Lopes
writes, “a work of art is interactive to the degree that the actions
of its users help generate its display (in prescribed ways).”29 In
26
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“Crossings,” participants help generate display by choosing
words from the sacred texts, which simultaneously appear on
the adjacent wall. The displays vary because different participants create different combinations of words. Furthermore, in
order to better “interact” with users, interactive computer
artworks include sensor systems, which records the participants’ gestures and change them into data that the computer can
process.30 Then, the data is “translated back into real-world
phenomena that people can perceive.”31 For example, “Boundary Functions” includes a sensor which detects people’s movement and then transforms the movement into languages that the
computer can process. Next the system produces data, which
are then translated to perceivable phenomena, i.e. lines and
cellular shapes projected on the floor.
Interactivity may appear nebulous at first glance. Because the concept plays such a pivotal role in understanding the
nature of interactive computer art, it is thus important to
understand the meaning of interactivity involved in this art
form. First, interactivity is different from active appreciation.
Traditional art forms, such as a painting, may evoke active
reflections by the viewer, whereas interactive computer art
allows viewers to generate the display. For instance, the
Romantic painting Monk by the Sea (1810) by the German
painter Caspar David Friedrich may elicit emotional effects of
its viewers, such as loneliness, generating further intellectual
engagement with the work. Although the piece leads to active
thinking by the viewer, it is not considered interactive. Lopes
defines this sort of engagement as “active appreciation,” and he
writes, “whereas art of all kinds invites active appreciation,
30
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only some art is interactive.”32 Active appreciation does not
alter the display of the work, which excludes it from the
concept of interactivity.
Second, another clarification regarding the concept interactivity regards its level. Only works that involve strong
interactivity are interactive computer art. The sort of interactivity involved in interactive computer art is different from weak
interactivity in that strongly interactive computer art do not
have pre-determined structures. For example, computer games
are strongly interactive media; the players determine how the
narrative develops when they make different choices.33 Lopes
writes, when “the structure itself is shaped in part by the
interactor’s choices,” the artwork is interactive.34 On the
contrary, the interaction involved in Michael Joyce’s hypertext
novel Afternoon is weak. The novel allows the readers to
explore different versions of the narrative each time by clicking
on different words.35 The role of the reader resembles that of a
tourist, without actively participating in the work; therefore, the
interaction is considered weak.36 Unlike strongly interactive
media video games, the structure of Afternoon is predetermined.
To participate in interactive art installations, audiences
are not required to have previous knowledge. Unlike performers, who have professional knowledge on the work and devote
efforts practicing the work prior to a performance, the audience
of the interactive artwork does not necessarily have knowledge
concerning the work prior to the interaction. For example, prior
to his performance of Beethoven’s No. 5 Concerto, Lang Lang
has thoroughly learned and practiced the piece. On the contrary,
32
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a participant of “Boundary Functions” does not have to know
about Voronoi diagrams and yet can still participate. The
computer, functioning as an interpreter, automatically generates
displays through computational processes when input is
given.37 The computer allows the user to learn and explore the
work by generating displays.
The medium of computer has several advantages over the
media of traditional art forms. First, the use of computers
brings a new light on the possibility of the medium. Paul
Crowther argues for the advantages of digital imagery, since
digital art and interactive computer art share the same medium,
and interactive computer art sometimes uses digital images.
Digital images simply mean computer graphics, which are noninteractive artworks displayed on a computer. In digital
artworks, the computer plays a similar role to the canvas of a
painting. The computer nevertheless radicalizes the contour and
mass features of traditional art.38 Crowther explains the
meaning of contour and mass:
When creating a picture, an artist operates, necessarily,
along an axis defined by two logical extremes…the
contours of a three-dimensional object or by assembling and blending marks so as to represent its mass,
or, of course, by combining elements of both.39
The French painter Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres’ work The
Virgin Adoring the Host (1852) exemplifies an extreme degree
of contours, as it has clear and precise outline.40 The British
painter Frank Auerbach’s piece Portrait of Julia (1960) shows
mass to an extreme degree—its physicality is so obvious that
37
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the work looks like “relief modeling.”41 Although it is according to the painter’s will on where in the contour-mass axis they
want to display in the work, and despite the fact that some
artists are capable of extraordinarily precise outlines and
realistic physicality, the computer outperforms humans.42 The
computer extends the capability of what humans can achieve in
that it allows the creation of images with the maximum mass
and contour features. Another difference between the computer
and other media, such as a canvas or a piece of paper, is that the
computer screen is flatter. Surprisingly, this does not diminish
the quality of displaying and even enhances the quality of threedimensional effect.43
Using its special language, the unique medium of the
computer also enables modification of the artwork and the
collaboration between artists. Similar to the software that
generates digital image, the program of interactive computer art
includes computer codes based on mathematic models.44 The
digital code can be altered through the manipulation of its
mathematic operations.45 Similar to digital images, the program
of interactive computer art is not permanent, since it allows
modifications from either the artist himself or other artists. This
revolutionary aspect shifts our understanding of the traditional
art-making process—once the work is done, it remains unchanged. The computer, in contrast, allows and encourages
ongoing collaborations and exchanges between artists, disciplines, and approaches.
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Interactive Computer Art as a Radical New Art Form
Information and technology dominate contemporary society in myriad ways: on a daily basis, we use cell phones for
communication, computers for work, and the Internet for
knowledge. Interactive computer art emerges organically from
this environment, and leads naturally to consideration of how
interactivity fits into the larger category of “art.”
As Weitz suggests, the development of art resembles an
ongoing adventure. The nature of the concept of art is open and
allows modification. As new art forms emerge, theorists decide
whether or not they share similarities with existing ones. It is
thus unwise to exclude new art forms, even radical ones, from
the category of art without thorough consideration. It is true
that interactive computer art exploits a new medium, the
computer, but a judicious theorist should not deny its status on
that basis. Similarities between interactive computer art and
traditional art forms are obvious; for example, interactive
installations include visual art, sound, and etc, and they are
usually shown in a museum. Not only does interactive computer art share similarities with traditional art, as discussed in the
second section, it even perfects certain aspects of existing art
forms. Interactive computer art works outperform human artists
in what they can achieve in the mass-contour axis and create
more realistic three dimensional effects. Furthermore, computers make possible combination of different art forms, such that
sounds, texts, and images could all be present in one setting.
Given that interactive computer art possesses a plentitude of
artistic values, it belongs to the open concept of art.
The core concept of interactive computer art, interactivity, also aligns with Dickie’s views on the important role of the
audience. Without an interactor, the work is incomplete.
However, unlike Dickie’s “artworld” concept that inherently
inclines to elitism, interactive installations welcome each
visitor, who often doesn’t have prior knowledge, to engage in
interaction. In this respect, interactive installations are approachable to a wide range of people as they require minimal
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artistic education. Since interactive computer art demands
audience participation, it highlights the audience, who play an
indispensable part of an artwork.
Furthermore, the interaction is advantageous to generating subjective universality as proposed by Kant. When an
audience member apprehends a painting, a sculpture, or other
traditional forms of art, there is always a distance between
them. Interactive installations eliminate such distance through
active participation. Whereas people are inclined to find formal
features of a painting, subjective feelings and emotions are
created when they interact with interactive works. Therefore,
instead of a passive mode of appreciation, interactive installations elicit active engagement. Interactive computer art exemplifies the concept of subjective universality.
What changes would maximize the development of interactive computer art? First, to give the artist more flexibility,
more computer software that “[allows] the artist access to
deeper levels of the computer’s programming system” should
be developed.46 Whereas many software programs that target
“specific tasks such as image manipulation” limit the artist’s
use of the computer to achieve their goals, programs that
integrate deep features of computing system allow more control
and creativity.47 Second, the computer artist could be equipped
with more technological knowledge of programming. Lacking
such knowledge, as observed by Linda Candy and Ernest
Edmonds, the artist usually rely on technology experts, and
they are less certain about how much power they have during
the art-making process.48
Interactive computer art, which involves active audience
engagement, represents a remarkable moment in the development of art. The new art form alters the traditional mode of
encountering art by allowing the audience to generate the
46
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artistic display itself, and the medium enables great improvement in terms of artistic techniques and audience experience. In
this digital era, everything changes rapidly—we will undoubtedly encounter many radical changes, not only in the art world,
but in society more broadly. Although we should cherish
traditions, an open mind is essential in the contemporary world.
If we always live within our predetermined meanings and
values, we will soon be overwhelmed by the multitude of
changes. Therefore, it is crucial to embrace valuable new
changes such as interactive art in order to function within our
rapidly developing society.
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Appendix

Nina Yankowitz, Crossings (2009)
http://www2.media.uoa.gr/~charitos/emobilart/exhibition_gr/img/crosings
_2.jp

Scott Snibbe, “Boundary Functions” (1998)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Ax4pgtHQDg
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AESTHETIC OBJECTIVISM’S “JOYOUS
POSSESSION OF THE (NATURAL) WORLD,”
TOWARDS A RELIGIOUSLY USEFUL
APPRECIATION OF SUBLIMITY IN
THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Maia Wellborn
Kant tells us that two things awe him most: the starry
skies above and the moral law within. But, we might ask, is
Kant mistaken in grounding the experience of sublimity in his
moral philosophy as an “attempt to unify art and ethics?”1
Appreciating the natural sublime in a way that seeks to understand the experience in an all-encompassing manner seems
quite sensible in some approaches to environmental aesthetics.
Understandably, then, scholars such as Allen Carlson and Noël
Carroll seem to defend versions of aesthetic objectivism such
that these connections are maintained. However, experiences in
the natural world that are termed “sublime,” can be better
understood through a specific kind of religious-aesthetic
appreciation. In what follows, I argue that the natural sublime
(sublimity as experienced in the natural world) is an experience
that is closer to what Merold Westphal might call “religiously
useful,” in that it inspires the sort of awe and celebration that
connects us to the divine. Building on a view of the sublime
which mirrors Emmanuel Levinas’s view of the ethical encounter with the Other, I contend that the natural sublime frustrates
1

Julian Young, “Death and Transfiguration: Kant, Schopenhauer and
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an aesthetic objectivist approach that requires truth values for
our judgments of what is beautiful and sublime. I will suggest
that since such objectivist accounts do not accurately capture
the phenomenological subjectivity experienced in the natural
sublime, postmodern religious thought can helpfully supplement the field of environmental aesthetics.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will describe what I
take to be the aesthetic objectivist theories of Carlson and
Carroll, showing why they are inadequate in describing our
experience of the natural sublime. Next, I will show how a
comparison of Levinas’s ethical encounter and the natural
sublime is relevant to the discussion in environmental aesthetics
because it grounds the content of this experience. Moreover, it
does so in a way that is “religiously useful” in ways similar to
Westphal’s description of the God of postmodern religious
thought. I conclude that an aesthetic appreciation of the natural
sublime should not reduce the subjective experience to the
phenomenal object’s properties and our judgments of it to true
or false propositions. That problematic approach falsely
delineates the sublime as merely an object in nature, thus
erasing the existential essence of such experiences.
The debate regarding how we ought to appreciate
nature is a much-discussed issue in contemporary environmental aesthetics. Allen Carlson notices the issues that arise in our
attempts either to treat nature as art objects or reduce nature to
picturesque landscapes. When we treat nature as an art object
we take it out of its environmental context and when we reduce
nature to picturesque landscapes we selectively and inappropriately choose from the whole of nature limited portions of it. As
Ronald Rees points out, this latter view of reducing nature to
the picturesque has “confirmed our anthropocentrism by
suggesting that nature exists to please as well as to serve us. …
It is an unfortunate lapse which allows us to abuse our local
environments and venerate the Alps and the Rockies.”2 Finding
2
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both approaches problematic, Carlson attempts to understand
nature in terms of its appropriate context, similar to how we
make aesthetic judgments of works of art. He writes, writes:
If to appropriately aesthetically appreciate art we must
have knowledge of art forms, classifications of works,
and artistic traditions, then to appropriately aesthetically appreciate nature we must have knowledge of the
different systems and elements within those environments…Thus, the natural and environmental sciences
are central to appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature.3
In the same way in which knowledge of painting in the early
twentieth century is necessary for appreciating the works of the
Cubists, some knowledge of flora and fauna are necessary to
appreciate a natural environment rich in flowers and plants.
Noël Carroll does not reject Carlson’s account, but offers an alternative view in which he claims that some aesthetic
judgments are emotional responses to nature, and that these are
just as valid as judgments based upon an understanding of the
natural sciences. What validates them is the appropriateness of
the emotional response to the natural environment a person
experiences. Carroll understands that a central question
concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature subsists in the
overarching dichotomy between aesthetic relativism and
aesthetic objectivism. The aesthetic relativist asserts that the
aesthetic judgments about nature are absolutely subjective
because they are entirely relative to those who make them. The
aesthetic objectivist, alternatively, claims that judgments about
nature are objectively true or false. In Carlson’s view aesthetic
Environment,” in Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical
Debates, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: Routledge,
2008), 161.
3
Ibid., 166.
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judgments can be true if they are based on correct knowledge of
the natural environment that one experiences. In Carroll’s
model, aesthetic judgments are true if the emotional response
they convey is appropriate to the natural environment one is
responding to.4 Both Carlson’s and Carroll’s models involve
judgments that are true or false based on matters of fact
concerning the aesthetic properties of some natural phenomena.
They both presuppose aesthetic objectivism when it comes to
the appreciation of nature. Specifically, they depend upon the
existence of universal, aesthetic properties inherent in natural
phenomena, while disagreeing about the location of such
properties and how to access them.
Both Carlson and Carroll have insightful reasons for
contending that aesthetic objectivism is preferable to aesthetic
relativism regarding our judgments about the natural world. If it
were not, it would seem impossible to characterize certain
phenomena as beautiful, striking, visually appealing, and so on.
Everything in the natural world would appear to us as a
“blooming buzzing confusion,”5 as William James writes. In
order to make sense of the world we make truth claims about
the aesthetic properties of some perceptual object. In doing this,
we pragmatically dissolve any epistemic limits to our cognition
in an effort to communicate what is “appropriate, correct, or
true.”6 By comparing nature to art, Carlson thinks we achieve
the method for making qualified judgments about nature.
Because “the objectivity of aesthetic judgments of art depends
upon identifying the correct category for the artwork in
question,”7 by applying the comparable paradigm or standard to
4
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natural phenomena we are able to make judgments which are
either true or false about such phenomena—with the natural
sciences serving as the standard for such judgments. Likewise,
Carroll thinks that because we can objectively judge our
emotional responses to what is experiences in nature as
appropriate of not, they can give us accurate aesthetic judgments of nature.
The aesthetic objectivist views that Carlson and Carroll
champion are problematic because they assume that objectively
true judgments about phenomena in the natural environment are
what we are looking for in our appreciation of it. However, I
would argue that there are experiences in nature that are aweinspiring in such a way that they problematize these types of
objective judgments. They are grounded in an essentially
subjective appreciation that is internal to a subject’s unique
relation to it. These are experiences of the natural sublime
which in some way exceed our appreciation of nature as
something beautiful.
The natural sublime is an experience in the natural
world that overwhelms us. It might involve a feeling whereby
the object of our perception throws us back on ourselves so that
we feel our total insignificance in comparison with to nature. In
some experiences with the natural world we ride the fine line
between appreciating the imperial grandeur of a phenomenon
and the displeasing anxiety that it can arouse in our relation to
it. Sublimity in nature only makes sense when I attempt to
make sense of myself in comparison to it. I notice the difference between what is out there in the world, and what I possess
as someone who experiences the out-there-ness. Sandra
Shapshay identifies this difference when she observes that,
“what is sublime for Kant is not something in the world—some
portion of the ‘real’ that we directly experience—but a feeling
we have that is occasioned by certain sensory experiences.”8 In
8

Sandra Shapshay, “Contemporary Environmental Aesthetics and the
Neglect of the Sublime.” British Journal of Aesthetics 52, no.2
(2013).

65

Furman Humanities Review
all of our attempts to describe the sublime we run into an
epistemic limit that allows us to communicate such experiences
only by appealing to subjective sentiments—overwhelming,
stunning, heart-palpitating. How should we approach making
judgments of an experience that necessarily involves a subject
who is at stake in the experience?
Emmanuel Levinas’s encounter with what he calls the
‘Other’ is a compelling place to start in thinking through the
answer to this question. The natural sublime may occasion a
kind of experience like the encounter with the Other, which is
initially the interruption to my “unchecked desire,” and my
“unbridled self-interest.”9 When I meet someone on the street
who asks me for spare change, for example, I am suddenly
interrupted by the Other who presents me with an ethical
responsibility. Even if I don’t think I should give them spare
change, I am still confronted with the ethical question: should I
or not? This ethical responsibility is brought about by an
asymmetrical relationship with an Other that I cannot fully
understand. For Levinas, this encounter is pre-ontological
because it inaugurates selfhood as a response to the infinite
demand upon us from each and every Other. This encounter
with the Other is not a spacio-temporal phenomenon because it
occurs in the realm of the ethical rather than in the domain of
being. For this reason Levinas answers in the negative to the
question “is ontology fundamental?” Instead, on his model, the
ethical encounter itself cannot be totalized in either concept or
being. This totality for Levinas, as Michael Morgan describes
it, is “the domain circumscribed, encompassed, and to a degree
constructed by the self of the agent, … the domain of reason or
mind or culture or theory.”10 The infinity of such an encounter
speaks to the inability of my understanding to completely grasp
the Other, and my inability ever to fully eradicate my responsibility to the Other. In this ethical encounter, I concede my
9
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ability totally to grasp the world—my very identity becomes a
response to the enigma that calls me into question and to
selfhood. My subjectivity, therefore, is a response to a question—one that is entirely foreign to me. In this sense, Levinas
asserts that subjectivity is not rooted in autonomy; it is ontologically conditioned by something exterior to it—a preceding
alterity. I gain myself because of the Other—as such, I am
never fully transparent to myself.
It follows that the experiences whereby my very
selfhood is at stake are of a different sort than the experiences
that I understand through reason alone. Being able to grasp the
beauty of a landscape in terms of an objective metric concerns
the aesthetic properties of the landscape (Carlson and Carroll).
However, an experience in nature that inaugurates my being at
stake in it is of another kind—it is the stuff of sublimity.
I imagine I am perceiving a landscape through a
detailed knowledge of the natural environment, or from behind
a camera lens at an overlook. Emotionally or cognitively, I
respond to the objects of perception as they appear—
aesthetically beautiful or complex. In doing so, I am totalizing
these objects according to my conceptual judgment of them, as
Levinas would say. I circumscribe, encompass, and construct
the view. I view it in a way in which I can rationally comprehend it. I intend an aesthetic object whereby judgments of
beauty, grandeur, etc. are of an objective quality because the
judgments are made about the object alone. What changes,
though, when I am 2000 ft. above ground on the side of a rockface, where I hang from a solitary anchor while rock-climbing?
The aesthetic appreciation we are likely to feel here (should we
dare to be there) is an altogether a different appreciation—one
that may make me aware of my finitude, shudder at the incalculable perspective, or attempt to tell myself that anxiety is
useless and I am not in danger. Any judgment I make will
necessarily be relevant to or informed by my own subjectivity—my own inability to remove the feeling from my experiencing of the sublime object. My experience with the natural
sublime is one I cannot appreciate on a basis that removes my
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subjectivity from the judgments—making them objectively the
case.
François Marty says that “totality is a matter for reason
and its satisfaction. Seeking the point at which differences rest
upon a ‘same,’ where the quest for unity is appeased, whereas
infinity is a matter for imagination.”11 Similarly, Matthew
Sanderson explains how in Kant’s view reason fits into his view
of the dynamical sublime. For Kant, the dynamical sublime
“consists in the mental relationship between sensibility and
reason that is excited by experiences of extremely powerful
natural objects...”12 In experiencing the dynamical sublime, first
we are fearful of being overwhelmed by the natural event so
that we become aware of our finitude. The event is something
that very well could crush us with absolute indifference.
However, the pleasure that we feel at the very next instant
supersedes the fear because our intellect has the ability to
reason. According to Julian Young, then, we stand in a sort of
imaginative distance with the object of sublimity in nature and,
thereby, feel this “expansion of the self, a flowing out of the
ego and into totality of things,” which Freud calls an “‘oceanic
feeling.”13
Because the sublime involves a subjective feeling
which synthesizes pleasure and displeasure towards a phenomenon, it does not warrant that a common aesthetic appreciation
for both the naturally beautiful and naturally sublime. Young
argues that “for a proper interpretation of the sublime, we need
a different metaphysics,”14 but must we embrace a blooming
buzzing confusion as a result? I think not. Jane Forsey de-
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scribes the epistemic issue with treating the sublime like an
object whose value is in its aesthetic properties when she says,
The heart of the problem, then, is this: if we focus on
the metaphysical status of the sublime object, our epistemology becomes problematic, but if we address instead the epistemological transcendence of a certain
experience, we still seem forced to make some metaphysical claim about the object of that experience.15
In order even to cognize the natural sublime we must first have
some idea about how to describe the phenomenon. Here we are
not totally without words. There is in fact a horizon of meaning
involved here just as there is in recognizing the Other in her
alterity. If there were not any horizon by which we could
account for such alterity, then the phenomena which “interrupt[s] our joyous possession of the world” would not interrupt
because it could not be apprehended at all. Crucially, Levinas
says that the Other “overflows” comprehension, not that the
other is incomprehensible. In the same way, we can say that the
natural sublime overflows our comprehension, not that it is
incomprehensible. What is required, then, is an appreciation
based on the tension between totality, because we do make
judgments about the natural sublime, and infinity, because these
judgments are always epistemically limited by subjectivity’s
inability to grasp transcendence in absolution.
What would it look like to engage with the excess of
the natural sublime without totalizing the phenomenon? In
Overcoming Onto-Theology, Merold Westphal considers a
similar question but in relation to religious existence. For
Westphal, this problem of expressing excess, while not eliminating the excess in the expression, occurs in the case of the
metaphysical God which we have fully subsumed under our
15
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own philosophical categories: “When we assume the adequacy
of our concepts to the divine reality, we make ourselves the
measure and master of that reality and convert it into the
invisible mirror of our intellectual capacities.”16 Westphal
warns, “when theology buys into this philosophical project, it
renders the God of whom it speaks religiously useless.”17 In
Martin Heidegger’s words, this is the God of philosophy and
“man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music
and dance before this god.”18 This reductionist tendency about
which Westphal and Heidegger are both worried, is strikingly
similar, I think, to an aesthetic objectivist appreciation of the
natural sublime.
Westphal suggests that Levinas answers the question as
to what God could come after postmodernism, saying, “We
must think of God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to
establish a relation irreducible to comprehension.” God
construed this way is quite appropriately another name for the
Other. Might we be more accurate in our judgments if we
apprehend the sublime object in nature similarly? Though
totalization is necessary, it is the burden of infinity imposed
through subjectivity that gives it real value. In the same fashion,
to totalize the experience of the sublime is to reduce the object
of our gaze to its aesthetic properties—to value such experiences through a reductionism—characteristic of aesthetic objectivism. What if the natural sublime were rethought, then, in such a
way as to allow for a suspension of objectivist epistemologies
in order to more appropriately gauge the object of the natural
sublime? What would this object be if not a phenomenon
available in full presence to my totalizing schemes? Appropriating Westphal, I think the answer is that the natural sublime
16
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becomes better understood as an invitation to existential
reflection.
I do not mean to suggest that the natural sublime is the
God of postmodernism, nor do I wish to equate the sublime
experience or feeling to the Other or the infinity from which the
Other calls forth. Rather, the paradigm is relevant because there
are numerous examples in relation to which Kant, Schopenhauer, Burke, and others have struggled to communicate the
essence of sublime experiences. How does one conceptualize
transcendence, as such? The natural sublime is uniquely
suitable to a phenomenologically religious discourse by means
of a Levinasian frame because it highlights the existential
traction of such an experience. It calls into question and at the
same time reaffirms the existence of the self in relation to what
is Other.
If, “the sublime is the experience of the excess of
infinity over totality,”19 then the natural sublime takes on a new
role—one that allows for an appreciation that judges such
experiences not on their aesthetic properties, but their existential relevance. The natural sublime is not valuable because it is
the activity of making life into an object of appreciation.
Rather, it is invaluable as the activity of appreciating life as a
subject living it. While the Other interrupts our “joyous
possession of the world,” the sublime interrupts our joyous
totalization of nature in the aesthetic objectivist attitude. The
natural sublime understood as such may not lead us to God or
replace our encounter with the Other, but it can provide us with
an experience that inspires the awe and celebration that has
traditionally been the province of the divine. The postmodern
approach can help us better to understand and appreciate this
existential dimension of the natural sublime—whether we are
hanging off of the cliff or taking a picture of it from a distance.

19
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